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HEADQUARTERS  
ADVISORY TEAM 72 (VINH BINH PROVINCE)  
DELTA REGIONAL ASSISTANCE COMMAND  
APO 96215


MACDR-72

DATE: 12 Feb 1973

SUBJECT: AFRIS Province Senior Advisor  
Completion of Tour Report (RCS MACCORDS 174.03)  
LTC Robert C. Hallmark 467-48-0557 PSA-VB

THRU DEPCORDS  
Delta Regional Assistance Command  
APO 96215

TO Hq. US. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
ATTN: MACCORBS (AC of Staff, CORDS)  
APO 96222



1. This is my Completion of Tour Report for the period 15 June 1972 to 15 Feb 73 with additional comments requested in message dated 28 Jan 73, MACCORDS, subject as above.

2. Special requirement:

a. (C) Final overall assessment of pacification as the cease-fire begins: For a seven day period prior to the cease-fire the GVN conducted intensive military operations which were successful in blunting the VC attempt for overt territorial control. With 157 VC killed and 54 weapons captured there is little question that the enemy suffered a major setback. The intensive fighting continued after the cease-fire decreasing slowly the three days then a noticeable drop in activity as Tet celebrations began. The first four days of the cease-fire resulted in an additional 138 VC killed including one VC District Chief. The two week period surrounding the cease-fire were the most penalizing to the VC military on record in Vinh Binh Province. Credit for the GVN military success must go to the Province Chief as he was able to motivate the soldiers for better than I would have thought possible.

Although the military structure has suffered over the past year, the VC seemed to have gained strength. The VCI did not surface to any noticeable degree after the cease-fire. Propaganda has increased considerably and has been successful in confusing the people. In those areas where there is established VCI control there was practically no military action as the VC military avoided contact. The VC have announced large increases in tax levies and have many people convinced that they intend to collect. Terrorist activities are increasing both against GVN officials and the general population.

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CLASSIFIED BY PSA, VINH BINH  
SUBJECT TO GDS OF EO 11652

~~EXEMPT CATEGORY: 111~~

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b. What major problems exist as are expected to emerge:

The VC infrastructure is quite strong in seven or eight villages in the province. There is little doubt that the VC control the majority of the population in some hamlets (25-30), however they do not have the military power to protect this population against the GVN if they show overt control. The GVN claims control, the VC do not openly contest, and the deception by both sides continues.

It is expected that the VC will take advantage of the racial conflict between the Vietnamese and Cambodian communities. Any change in the status quo in Cambodia will be felt in Vinh Binh and VC propaganda will further muddle the situation. A suggestion here is that the American should not get excited about this situation since there is no short term solution.

The International Control Commission is going to be faced with problems of obtaining correct information. (No suggested solution).

c. Recommendation for actions to be taken by the following organizations:

In Vinh Binh Province the cease-fire offers a opportunity to make significant gains in development. Road construction and repair should be given top priority as any interference by the VC would work against their control of population.

In the past few months the GVN has been making headway with propaganda. The GVN must be encouraged to "blow its own horn."

\*NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION\*

\*Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal  
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SECTION I

NAME: HALLMARK, ROBERT C.

GRADE: LTC

SSAN: 467-48-0557

BRANCH OF SERVICE; IN

PROVINCE: Vinh Binh

INCLUSIVE DATES OF TOUR: 15 Aug 71 - 15 Jun 72 assigned as Deputy for  
Plans and Operation. 15 Jun 72 - 15 Feb 73 as  
PSA

EXPECTED REASSIGNMENT DATE: 15 Feb 73

PREVIOUS TOUR(S) IN VIETNAM (DATE - INCLUSIVE) Jul 1966 - Jul 1967

ASSIGNMENT OF PREVIOUS VIETNAM TOUR(S) Avn Co Comdr  
S-3 Avn Bn

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## SECTION II

1. What background did you have for your position?

19 years experience as Army Officer. Previous tours in Southeast Asia. Civilian Schooling - MA in Political Science.

2. What training did you have for this position?

MATA - 5 weeks, FT Bragg, N.C. 10 months OJT as Deputy for Plans and Operations, Vinh Binh Province.

3. What additional training would you suggest for your position?

Since I did not attend any of the courses normally required for assignment as PSA, I feel these would have been helpful.

4. What should be the length of tour for your position?

2 years minimum.

5. Was support from Region and/or Saigon Headquarters satisfactory? If not, specify deficiencies.

These comments are directed at support of military personnel:

Finance: The most inadequate support I have experienced. If a soldier's pay ever had an error, it seemed impossible to get it corrected. With records in Saigon, a soldier was lost for a minimum of three days to make the trip and then was often told by the finance officer to come back in two weeks. Clerks were not cooperative when one man was sent to Saigon to check on the pay problems of others. The Army policies of payroll deductions for Soldiers Deposits, bank deposits, allotments, etc, so complicate the system that chances of errors multiply. I found that those individuals who received all their pay "across the board" had little difficulty and it seemed a simple matter to have the Class "A" agent take back money for bank accounts and savings.

FUNDS: The complicated systems of accounting in the numerous different funds maintained at province level exceeded the capabilities of the team. A different officer was required by regulation for each fund (this was not complied with in all cases) and the frequent trips out of province to region and Saigon detracted from the advisors primary tasks.

AIR TRANSPORTATION: I found Air America quite reliable provided prior bookings had been made. However, if a military member of CORDS was at region or Saigon trying to return to province, there was no provision made for that person to get a booking. Quite often when a person left province on official business the return time and date would be unknown.

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6. Were there any programs delayed because support was not forthcoming?  
Were there any programs that were especially successful because support was readily available? Which ones?

N/A

7. Do the reporting requirement as set forth in Joint Directive 4-70 provide a means for reporting all information of present and future value? If not, what changes would you recommend?

As the military phasedown continues the means to comply with reporting requirements will be insufficient.

8. Do the MACCORDS Management Information System Field Reporting requirements set forth in Joint Directive 4-70 adequately measure progress in pacification programs?

As with any system that reflects on the performance of those reporting there is a built in tendency for inflation.

9. Were instructions from higher headquarters clear with no conflicting requirements? If not, what specific instances occurred where conflicting instructions were received?

The requirements placed on the planning for 1972 - 75 CD&LD program were not realistic and became more complicated with each new directive.

10. The most clearly defined and directed programs are:

1. LTT
2. RDC
3. Public Safety

11. The most effective para military forces are:

1. SRG
2. APT
3. PF

12. The most successful pacification programs are:

1. LTT
2. RF/PF
3. Economic Development - Banks in particular



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13. The programs that have the greatest impact upon the pacification effort are:

1. RF/PF
2. LTT
3. Economic Development

14. The least successful pacification programs are:

1. Phung Hoang
2. Peoples Organizations
3. VIS

15. The programs that have the least impact upon the pacification effort are:

1. VSD
2. Peoples Organizations
3. Youth & Sports

16. The rural people (are) aware of the pacification efforts the GVN and US are making. If not, how can they be informed?

As a rule most people are aware of the efforts but do not identify the results. More contact by government officials would be most helpful.

17. The people, as you know them, are more committed to the GVN than when you assumed your job. Why?

The governments help in economic development primarily through LOC construction and security.

18. Do you feel that the pacification plan is sufficiently detailed to provide guidance and set goals that will result in security and growth of Vietnam? (Yes) (No) if no, what change in the plan should be made?

Yes - some goals for security in Vinh Binh Province are not realistic - too high.

19. Do you feel that the pacification plan was adequately communicated and explained to you and your counterpart? (Yes) (No) If not, how can this be accomplished?

No - as a rule, I feel most Vietnamese do not understand the details of the pacification plan: I watched three province chiefs and three deputies for administration stumble with the different programs. They need training in the implication of the programs. To my knowledge there is no orientation course for a province chief or deputy - they get the job and then start trail and error procedures.

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## SECTION III FUNCTIONAL AREAS

### TERRITORIAL SECURITY DIRECTORATE

RF/PF: This is one program that is ineffective compared to potential because it is filled with corrupt practices and broken promises. The recent upgrading programs were broken promises to the people and added leverage for officials to squeeze bribes from families and RF/PF members. Flower soldiers still exist and RF soldiers can buy assignments and/or less hazardous duty. PF must pay to even join and then with additional money can be assigned to preferable jobs in the more secure areas. Accomodations with the VC is common - only following the practices of village, district and higher officials. There is animosity between PF and ARVN soldiers. PF soldiers live at home and have many opportunities to "moonlight" thus making them wealthy compared to ARVN soldiers.

Recommendation: Corruption must be eliminated if an effective force is to be developed. This must begin with the Commander-in-Chief. Officials below this level are caught in the "system" and have relative little flexibility.

PSDF: Generally quite effective once military security and VCI elimination has been established. In less secure areas, they are infiltrated by VC and/or reach on accomodation. Their ranks must be purged of draft dodgers and deserters.

### PUBLIC SAFETY DIRECTORATE

National Police Field Force: Generally misused in Vinh Binh. They are a readily available security force and are used primarily in that role rather than on offensive operations against the VCI. Since they are not controlled (see below) by the District Chief, they are often left out of military operations as a follow-up force.

National Police Operations: The US concept of operational control does not seem to be acceptable within the Vietnamese structure. In the National Police system the Province Police Commander is much more responsive to the superiors at region and Saigon than to the Province Chief. Can you picture the President appointing State Police Chiefs in the US. I feel this is going to have an adverse effect on elimination of VCI.

RECOMMEND: Police Chiefs report only to Province Chiefs.

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## COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DIRECTORATE

Village Self Development: The basic concept of this program was to unite the people of a village and have them work together for self improvement. This has failed. The people do not select projects rather the village or district chief. Generally a 10% cut on all projects by officials at district level produces inferior and undesirable projects. As recommended before this program should be terminated.

RD CADRE: A very useful group, however, they have not been as effectively used in Vinh Binh because of distrust of the Province Chief of the RD Commander. The RD Commander is a close friend and supporter of a member of the lower House who dislikes the Province Chief. RD cadre are probably the most effective organization with dedication to aid pacification.

Ethnic Minorities: N/A

Local Government: A vital program that must be further developed but through Vietnamese programs. Saigon, Region and Province levels must push some of the talent back down to village level rather than pull all able persons into headquarters. The Vietnamese people rarely get very concerned about what happens outside of their village - this is the level where people control develops. The resent training programs are a step in the right direction but leadership is badly needed.

AIK: Too much of the money used to cover recurring expenses that should be funded on an annual basis. Also funds are expended to bail out projects that exceed allocated funds, particularly in the education field.

## REFUGEE DIRECTORATE

Refugee: Relative few refugee's have developed in Vinh Binh but on those occasions where assistance was required the system worked acceptably. There has been some delay in processing claims.

## WAR VICTIMS DIRECTORATE

Social Welfare: Because of the large sums of money involved, these programs are subject to graft and corruption. For a one year period no SW payments were made in the province for a combination of reasons - officials did not understand the system, they were afraid of handling the large sums of money, it was convenient to keep the money in the bank and draw interest. The log jam was broken with a new Province Chief and Deputy for Administration. More training of officials would most certainly improve the program.

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## CHIEU HOI DIRECTORATE

Chieu Hoi: This program should be dropped for the following reasons:

- a. Expensive
- b. False ralliers
- c. Few ralliers
- d. Limited and unreliable information is obtained.

## REPORTS AND ANALYSIS DIRECTORATE

Report Requirements: Reasonable in most cases. Exceptions: One time reports with short suspense dates that require input from village or district level activities. We no longer have advisors in many areas.

Report Feedback: Except for comparison to other province, the feedback is of little value since the provinces supplied the input.

## PHOENIX DIRECTORATE

Phoenix: This program has received more advisory effort, money and command emphasis by the US than any program and yet failed. IT has now been buried in the police system where I feel it should remain until the Vietnamese at all levels quit giving lip service to the program and eliminate the corrupt practices. Finding and killing and/or capturing the VCI is a relative simple matter for the Vietnamese officials at Province and below because they know who they are and can easily identify them. It is too simple for officials to accept pay offs at District level and below. I estimate that 25% of the taxes collected by the VC is used as protection money. (This would amount to 50,000,000\$) in Vinh Binh Province in CY 1972). I would guess that those few VCI who are eliminated through targeted operations had failed to pay protection money. Unless the officials at all levels are willing to close their gold mine the program will remain ineffective.

## AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Public Health: Direct the programs more to what the people feel will help them, i.e., medical training and facilities. The sanitary hamlet program is strange to the people - they are not ready to stop using the road or canal as a latrine.

Education: Technical and agricultural schools are the basic educational needs of the people. These should be emphasized and drop some of the liberal arts programs.

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Public Works: This area has the greatest potential to win the people to support their government. What public works does is seen and felt economically by the people. More support in form of material, equipment and labor is needed. The capability for inter province road construction should be increased considerably.

Economic Development: Economic growth will make capitalists out of Communists. Road improvement and river port facilities are needed and would clearly have the longest impact on development. The supply of money through ADB and RB books are excellent programs.

Land Reform: An excellent program that has had a major impact on the people. There is hope for continued expansion but LTTT program should not try to outstrip security forces and the opening of LOC's.

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## PSA COMMENTS

For those of you who have gotten to this point in my final report I wish to comment on what I feel may be your impression. You may feel that I consider most programs either black or white with no gray areas - either optimistic or pessimistic. This is generally true. (I have found that so often the success or failure of a program depends upon the abilities of one or two individuals). However when a total is produced I am very optimistic about the future of Vinh Binh Province and South Vietnam. During my tour the day to day efforts it is quite easy to see failure but over the past eighteen months I have seen solid progress. The most impressive aspect has been the gains in the efficiency of the government to govern - that is to provide for the people.

Now I would like to thank those members of CORDS who have been so helpful and willing to assist me in my job. There is no question that I have profitted from the association with many talented people in a most unique organization. I envy those who will remain, for I know of no greater challenge or personal reward than being an advisor in this country.

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